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I. INTRODUCTION 
The connection between corporate governance and stock market development 
has become a topic of intense debate within and across law, finance and economics.  It 
has spurred an explosion of research into a number of topics including what types of 
legal systems are associated with stock market growth, what are the pre-conditions for 
stock market growth, what kinds of legal reforms are associated with such growth, and 
what are the conditions under which such legal reforms arise.  Although the literature 
initially focused on the legal origins of a country’s legal system (e.g., civil law or 
common law) and methods of protecting minority shareholders, the discussion has now 
turned to the importance of enforcement. Much of this literature studies the role of 
enforcement in more developed markets (e.g., US, UK, Europe and Japan), and there 
has been little analysis of the importance of enforcement in the context of emerging 
markets, which are usually characterized as suffering from weak and corrupt 
enforcement.   Studying emerging markets may provide important insights into how 
stock market growth and law are inter-connected and what kinds of legal reforms may 
be most beneficial to enhancing the growth of stock markets in emerging markets.   
This paper investigates the potential connection among corporate governance 
reforms, sanctions, enforcement, and firm value in a large emerging market, namely 
India. The analysis employs financial statement and other data from the Prowess 
database for a large sample of over 4000 Indian firms over 1998-2006. The source of 
exogenous variation is a sequence of reforms to India’s corporate governance regime, 
beginning in 2000. In that year, Clause 49 (of the stock exchange listing agreement for 
publicly-traded corporations) was introduced, mandating greater board independence, 
enhancing disclosure requirements, and increasing the power of audit committees for 
affected firms. Importantly, however, not all Indian corporations were subject to Clause 
49, and even among affected firms, not all were immediately subject to the new 
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provisions. A small number of very large firms were expected to comply by 2001, a 
larger number of medium-sized firms were expected to comply by 2002, and the 
remainder of the affected firms (which were mostly quite small in size) were expected 
to comply by 2003. In addition, firms that listed for the first time in 2000 (or later) were 
expected to comply from the time of listing. Firms that were outside all of these groups 
were not expected to comply with Clause 49. The unaffected firms were generally 
smaller than the affected firms. However, the legal criteria for being subject to Clause 49 
were framed primarily in terms of firms’ paid up share capital (at the time the shares 
were issued), which is only imperfectly correlated with size as measured, for instance, 
by the book value of assets. Thus, there was considerable overlap in terms of size 
between the smaller firms subject to Clause 49 and the larger firms among those that 
were not subject to the new rules. 
As Clause 49 was framed as a change to the listing agreement, the initial penalty 
for violations was delisting. However, in 2004, India’s securities laws were amended to 
introduce large financial penalties for directors of firms that were found to be in 
violation of Clause 49. The introduction of these severe sanctions was quite separate in 
time from the dates on which firms became subject to the new rules (2000-2003). This 
provides an unusual opportunity to not only test the effect of the substantive law, but 
also to test the effects of changes in sanctions and enforcement (independently of the 
effect of the substantive law).1 
The paper’s primary hypothesis concerns the impact of the 2004 sanctions on 
firm value (as measured by Tobin’s q). The analysis uses a difference-in-difference 
approach, comparing a treatment group of firms that were subject to Clause 49 (and 
                                                
1 For expositional ease we sometimes refer to these interchangeably as changes in sanctions or enforcement. Strictly 
speaking, the changes were sanction increases, but the literature on enforcement and stock market development often 
treats sanction increases as changes in enforcement or a way to measure enforcement (Jackson and Roe, 2007; Coffee, 
2007). Of course, changes in sanctions and enforcement both affect expected sanctions. 
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hence to the new sanction and enforcement regime from 2004 onwards) with a control 
group of firms that were not subject to Clause 49 (or to its sanction and enforcement 
regime). The regression specification controls for various relevant factors and for firm-
specific time trends in q, so that the estimated effect represents the extent to which a 
Clause 49 firm’s value deviates from its underlying trend following the introduction of 
the sanctions, relative to the corresponding deviation for unaffected firms. Using this 
approach, the paper finds a large and statistically significant positive effect (amounting 
to over 10% of firm value) of the Clause 49 reforms in combination with the 2004 
sanctions. This result is robust to various checks, and in particular continues to hold 
when comparing only the smaller firms that were subject to Clause 49 and the larger 
firms among those that were not subject to Clause 49. The sharp discontinuity created 
by the applicability of the new rules above a specific level of paid up share capital also 
enables the use of a regression discontinuity approach, which leads to very similar 
results.  Our results, taken together, present a strong case for a causal effect of the 
reforms on firm value, and also underscore the importance of enforcement.   
Overall, the results suggest that, while firms had the option of voluntarily 
adopting governance provisions similar to those in Clause 49, they benefited from the 
ability to commit (e.g. to not expropriating minority shareholders) that was provided by 
the external public enforcement and sanctioning mechanism. The paper also explores 
the channels through which this increase in firm value may have occurred. Over the 
(relatively short) post-reform sample period, there is no robust evidence that the 
reforms led to improved accounting performance, a reduction in tunneling within 
business groups (as measured using the approach developed by Bertrand, Mehta, and 
Mullainathan (2002)), or an increase in foreign institutional investment. Rather, it 
appears that the increase in firm value capitalized expectations of longer-term benefits 
of the reforms. 
4
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Part II briefly reviews the related literature. Part III details the development of 
corporate governance reform in India while laying out the groundwork for our 
empirical tests.  Part IV describes the data. Part V elaborates on the empirical 
specifications and hypotheses. Part VI reports the results and robustness checks. Part 
VII interprets the results and describes a number of extensions. Part VIII concludes. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper contributes to the literature on the important question of the 
relationship between law and stock market development.2 In addition to bringing new 
evidence to bear on the central question of whether there is a causal relationship 
between better corporate governance and firm value, the paper focuses in particular on 
the role of enforcement and sanctions.  
Previous literature on the impact of corporate governance on firm value has 
faced the problem that most governance reforms in the US have applied to all firms, 
making it difficult to isolate a credible control group.3 Increasingly, attention has also 
been directed to the relationship between governance and firm value outside the US. In 
particular, this paper is most closely related to studies that exploit the Korean corporate 
governance reforms of the 1990’s as a source of exogenous variation. Black, Jang & Kim 
(2006) construct a Korean corporate governance index (KCGI) for a cross-section of 
Korean firms. They examine the effect of the KCGI on firm value, instrumenting for the 
KCGI using an asset size variable that captures the threshold (at 2 trillion won) for the 
application of the reforms. They also use a regression discontinuity analysis around this 
                                                
2 The modern discussion of this question begins with the seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & 
Vishny (1998) on the impact of legal origins. Much of the literature on stock market development undertakes cross-
country analysis (e.g. Durnev and Kim, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2006); however, single-country 
studies such as this paper also play an important role in shedding light on these issues, and can avoid some of the 
methodological challenges associated with cross-country analysis.  
3 However, the literature on the US has used various other sources of identification, including the adoption of anti-
takeover provisions (Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, 2005), state antitakeover laws 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003), variation in disclosure requirements for smaller firms (Greenstone, Oyer and 
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2006), and foreign firms cross-listed in the US (Litvak, 2007). 
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threshold. Both approaches yield a positive effect. Black, Kim, Jang, and Park (2005) use 
a panel of Korean firms, and exploit within-firm variation over time in the KCGI to find 
a positive effect on firm value (also instrumenting with the asset size dummy). 
However, as the asset size instrument is not time-varying, their panel analysis does not 
allow for firm fixed effects. 
This paper uses panel data, and allows not only for year and firm fixed effects, 
but also for firm-specific time trends. The latter is especially important because 
differential time trends in value for the larger firms affected by a reform, relative to the 
smaller unaffected firms, is an important concern in both the Korean and Indian 
reforms. We do not use a firm-level governance index like the KCGI,4 but in some 
respects this may be an advantage as it eliminates potentially endogenous changes in 
firms’ governance choices. Furthermore, while Black, Jang & Kim (2006) use a 
regression discontinuity analysis, the panel dataset here permits a first-differenced 
version of this approach that controls for unobserved heterogeneity (see the discussion 
in Part VI below).  
The literature on Korea and other emerging markets also does not address the 
role of enforcement and sanctions. Recent scholarship has stressed that law enforcement 
may be beneficial for a variety of reasons,5 encouraging smaller investors to invest in 
firms, thereby fostering stock market development. This paper provides empirical 
evidence on this issue, exploiting the timing of the Indian reforms (in particular, the 
feature that severe sanctions were introduced only after the substantive legal rules were 
already established). 
                                                
4 Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna (2008) conduct a detailed survey of Indian firms, and find that better governed 
firms tend to have higher value. 
5 e.g. because it provides investors with assurances about the credibility of firm disclosures (Daines & Jones 2007), 
protects investors’ property rights against expropriation, signals government attitudes about acceptable governance 
standards and what areas may bear the brunt of enforcement scrutiny (Milhaupt & Pistor, 2008), and provides 
investors with a sense that they can have their grievances addressed in some efficacious manner (Coffee, 2007; 
Bhattacharya & Daouk, 2002). 
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Finally, this paper also contributes more specifically to the empirical evaluation 
of the Indian governance reforms.  Black & Khanna (2007) conduct an event study of the 
adoption of Clause 49.  They rely on the phased implementation schedule, in which 
“large” firms were required to comply before “small” firms, and report positive returns 
for a treatment group of large firms relative to a control group of small firms, around 
the first important legislative announcement. 
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN INDIA:  THE RISE OF CLAUSE 49. 
India, unlike a number of emerging markets, has had actively functioning stock 
markets since 1875 and a fairly detailed corpus of corporate and securities laws 
(Khanna, 2008). However, prior to the governance reforms described below, Indian 
corporate governance in practice was considered weak and quite dysfunctional. 
Inconsistent disclosure and largely ineffective boards of directors led to a failing system 
of governance in which insider diversion was not uncommon. Indeed, Indian firms 
looking for capital had to rely primarily on internal sources or on the capital provided 
by various arms of the government, rather than the stock market (for more details see 
Khanna (2008)).  
This situation formed the background to the promulgation of Clause 49 of the 
stock exchange listing agreement in 2000 by the Securities & Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI – India’s securities markets regulator).6 The first tentative steps toward Clause 49 
occurred in 1998 when the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) – a large industry 
association – proposed a voluntary code of corporate governance for Indian firms.  This 
was followed in quick measure by SEBI forming the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee 
(KMBC) to suggest changes in the listing agreement of the stock exchanges to address 
corporate governance concerns. The KMBC’s draft set of recommendations came out on 
                                                
6 Earlier reforms started almost with the creation of the Securities & Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992; some of 
the key regulations were the SEBI Takeover Code 1997 (dealing with acquisitions of control primarily) and the SEBI 
Disclosure & Investor Protection Guidelines 1999 (addressing public issuances of securities). 
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October 1, 1999 and became effective as Clause 49 of the listing agreement with the 
Exchanges on February 21, 2000. Firms failing to meet the requirements of Clause 49 
could be delisted. The details of Clause 49 are provided in Appendix 1, but a quick 
overview is provided below (see also Khanna (2008)). 
Clause 49 had both requirements and recommendations.  In the required camp 
were a number of reforms designed to enhance the independence of boards.  This 
involved prescribing minimum percentages of independent directors (50% or 33% 
depending on whether the Chairman was an executive director) and providing a fairly 
stringent definition of “independence”.  In addition to this, Clause 49 mandated the 
number of meetings per year, expected boards to develop a code of conduct and 
imposed limits on the number of directorships a director could simultaneously hold.   
Clause 49 also enhanced the power of the audit committee by requiring financial 
literacy, experience and independence of its members, and by expanding the scope of 
activities on which the audit committee had oversight.  Executives were also expected 
to be more personally involved in corporate affairs as seen by the requirements for 
certification by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of 
financials and overall responsibility for internal controls. This was combined with 
considerably enhanced disclosure obligations (on many things including accounting 
treatment and related party transactions) and enhanced requirements for holding 
companies when overseeing their subsidiaries.  These series of changes appear aimed at 
making Boards and Audit Committees more independent, powerful and focused 
monitors of management.  Moreover, the enhanced disclosures would aid institutional 
and foreign investors in monitoring management as well. 
Clause 49’s provisions were not expected to be implemented immediately, 
rather, it provided a phased-in implementation schedule where certain firms 
(essentially large ones) were expected to comply earlier than mid sized firms which 
were expected to comply earlier than small sized firms. Specifically, firms that were 
8
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 84 [2008]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art84
 8
listed on the Bombay (Mumbai) Stock Exchange (BSE) under the listing flag “A” were 
expected to comply by March 31, 2001. These are generally the largest corporations in 
the Indian economy, and are referred to in the remainder of the paper as “Group 1” 
firms.   
Firms that were outside this group, but had paid up share capital of at least Rs. 
10 crores (roughly US$2,500,000)7 or net worth of at least Rs. 25 crores (roughly 
US$6,250,000) at any time in the company's history, were expected to comply by March 
31, 2002. Paid-up share capital is the number of shares outstanding, multiplied by the 
“face value” of the shares (i.e. the price at which the share certificates were originally 
issued).  Net worth is a similar concept, but also incorporates the face value of preferred 
stock, and adjusts for the firm’s retained earnings and various reserves.8  The firms 
expected to comply in 2002 are referred to below as “Group 2” firms.   
Finally, other firms with paid up share capital of at least Rs. 3 crores (roughly 
US$750,000) were expected to comply by March 31, 2003; these firms are referred to 
below as “Group 3” firms. Importantly, Clause 49 was not intended to apply to all 
publicly-traded and listed firms in India, with those firms with paid up share capital 
below Rs. 3 crores being completely exempt from its provisions.9 This sequence of 
reforms is illustrated by the timeline in Figure 1. 
 These reforms established how governance was to change in India and their 
violation could lead to de-listing, but no other financial penalties.  Although potentially 
significant, de-listing is less personally painful for executives than direct financial 
penalties and the threat of imprisonment.  Thus, for our purposes, the next important 
                                                
7 In India a crore means 10 million Rupees; thus, for instance, 10 crores is identical to 100 million Rupees (roughly 
US$2,500,000) and 25 crores is 250 million Rupees (roughly US$6,250,000).   
8 The definitions of net worth and paid up capital come from Prowess. Note that the backward-looking nature of 
these criteria help to address the concern that firms may have endogenously chosen whether to be in the affected or 
unaffected group. 
9 In this respect, Clause 49 differs from the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms in the US. The unaffected firms play a crucial role 
in this paper’s empirical strategy, as described below. 
9
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reforms were the adoption of direct financial penalties for violation of Clause 49’s 
requirements.  In 2004 the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956 was amended to 
include Section 23E that imposed significant financial penalties for violations of the 
listing agreement (up to Rs. 25 crore (roughly USD 6,250,000) for a violation).10 Since 
2005, there has not been much in the way of significant corporate governance changes 
to either the listing agreement or the statute.11 
IV. DATA 
 The data for this study is obtained from Prowess, a database that is maintained 
by the Center for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess reports financial 
statement, share prices, and other relevant data for publicly-traded Indian corporations. 
Prowess data is typically available only for a limited window of years; this analysis uses 
data for the period 1998-2006. While the estimating samples are generally smaller due to 
missing values for some variables, the basic sample includes 28,672 observations at the 
firm-year level over this period, on 4335 firms. Prowess variables are reported as of 
December 31 of each year; thus, any legal changes occurring during a given calendar 
year are assumed to be reflected in that same year’s financial data (e.g. the sanctions 
introduced in October, 2004 are assumed to affect Prowess variables reported for 2004). 
 The primary dependent variable of interest in this analysis is Tobin’s q, used (as 
is standard in the corporate finance literature) as a proxy for firm value. For firm i in 
year t, Tobin’s q is defined as: 
                                                
10 Inserted by Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004, S.11 (which takes effect from Oct. 12, 2004).   
11 There were no enforcement actions under Section 23E or Clause 49 until September 2007 when SEBI initiated its 
first enforcement and investigation proceedings against firms for violations of Clause 49 (see Ashish Rukhaiyar, 
Navratnas Join Listing Rule Violators, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, 13 Sept., 2007; SEBI Pulls up 20 Clause 49 Violators, THE 
ECONOMIC TIMES, 12 Sept., 2007). These proceedings are still in progress. Of course, it is plausible that the threat of 
enforcement may affect behavior even if there are no actual enforcement actions. 
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The book value of debt is proxied by the Prowess variable “borrowings,” and the book 
value of preferred stock by the Prowess variable “preference capital.”  The book, rather 
than market, value of preferred stock is used because preferred stock is very thinly 
traded, if at all. The market value of common stock uses data from Prowess on share 
prices and on the number of common shares outstanding. The share price is calculated 
as the 365-day average of the daily stock prices reported in Prowess.12 The denominator 
uses the Prowess variable “total assets.” 
 The formulation in Eq. (1) corresponds closely to standard definitions of q in the 
literature (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2008), with some caveats. First, deferred tax liability is omitted in Eq. (1); 
however, a definition of q incorporating deferred tax liability is used in robustness 
checks (and leads to similar results). Second, it is possible that some recently-issued 
debt is omitted by Prowess in its “borrowings” variable and reported instead as 
“current liabilities.” To address this possibility, the basic analysis uses current liabilities 
as a control variable, and a definition of q incorporating current liabilities is used in 
robustness checks (again, this leads to similar results). The values of q (as defined in Eq. 
(1)) calculated from the Prowess data include some obvious outliers; for instance, the 
maximum observed value is 1009.2. Thus, in the basic analysis below, q is Winsorized 
from above at the 5% level. The results, however, are similar when q is Winsorized from 
above at the 1% level. 
                                                
12 The 365-day average is used because using the December 31 price (to correspond to the Prowess financial statement 
variables) may be subject to seasonal factors, or to high degree of randomness. The use of the 365-day average  tends 
to bias against the paper’s findings – e.g. the estimated response of q to a legal change in October of 2004 would 
understate the effect, as q is averaged over all of 2004, while investors could only respond to the change (if it was 
unanticipated) in or after October. 
11
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 The central independent variable of interest captures the application of the 
Clause 49 rules and enforcement provisions. As was pointed out in the discussion 
above, the implementation of Clause 49 took place through a number of steps 
(illustrated in Figure 1). In 1999, the set of firms that would eventually be subject to 
Clause 49 was identified. However, compliance was not expected to be immediate.  The 
largest firms (those listed under flag “A” at the BSE) were expected to comply in 2001 
(Group 1). Another, much larger, group of medium-sized firms were expected to 
comply in 2002 (Group 2). The remaining Clause 49 firms (the smallest in size) were 
expected to comply in 2003 (Group 3).13 While implementation was phased in for 
existing firms, all firms that listed for the first time in 2000 or subsequent years were 
expected to comply from the time of listing (regardless of their size). The date of listing 
is not reported in Prowess.14 However, it is possible to identify those firms that enter the 
Prowess dataset in 2000 or a subsequent year; these firms can be presumed to be newly-
listed, and so are classified as being subject to Clause 49 from the first year in which 
they enter the dataset.15 The results are robust, however, to omitting these new firms, or 
to reclassifying them as not being subject to Clause 49. 
  Given the sequence described above, it is possible to construct a “reform” 
variable (denoted Rit) capturing the applicability of Clause 49 that is time-varying for a 
given firm, taking on the value 1 when firm i is subject to Clause 49 in year t, and zero 
otherwise. Thus, for instance, a Group 2 firm (expected to comply in 2002) would have 
Rit = 0 for 1998-2001 and Rit = 1 for 2002-2006. However, the enforcement provisions 
(involving severe financial penalties) were introduced in 2004 when all the firms that 
                                                
13 These various groups of firms are readily identified using the Prowess variables for “net worth” and “paid-up 
share capital.”  Prowess also reports the BSE listing flag. 
14 Prowess reports the “year of incorporation,” but this does not necessarily correspond to the year in which the firm 
first became a publicly traded corporation.  The firm may have been formed (“incorporated”) in one year and the 
promoters may have decided to list it at a later point in time. 
15 This assumption is justified to the extent that Prowess is genuinely exhaustive in its scope. Admittedly, this 
introduces some possibility of misclassification; however, the results do not depend on how these new firms are 
treated in the analysis. 
12
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would ever be subject to Clause 49 were already supposed to be in compliance. Thus, 
while Rit is used in some supplementary analyses, the basic analysis uses a measure that 
is a simpler, non-time-varying indicator (denoted CL49i) that takes on the value 1 if firm 
i was ever subject to Clause 49, and 0 otherwise. This variable is used to construct a 
proxy for the applicability of severe penalties for violation of Clause 49 (namely, the 
interaction between CL49i and an indicator for the years 2004-2006 – see Eq. (2) below). 
An obvious concern with this paper’s empirical design is the comparability of 
those firms that were subject to Clause 49 and those that were not. To address this issue, 
Figure 2 depicts the average size of Clause 49 firms and non-Clause 49 firms (those that 
were not subject to the reforms at any stage of the sample period).16 While the legal 
criteria for the application of Clause 49 were defined in terms of paid-up share capital 
and net worth, Figure 2 uses a simpler and more intuitive summary characteristic of 
firms – total assets. The Clause 49 criteria are positively correlated with total assets, but 
only imperfectly so; thus, there is a considerable amount of overlap in asset size 
between smaller firms subject to Clause 49 and those not subject to it. As shown in 
Figure 2, Clause 49 firms are indeed considerably larger in terms of mean asset size. 
This is primarily attributable, however, to Group 1 and Group 2 firms, rather than to 
Group 3 firms (defined by Clause 49 as those with paid-up share capital exceeding Rs. 3 
crores (roughly US$750,000)). If attention is restricted to the non-Clause 49 firms that fall 
just below the 3 crore cutoff (specifically, those with maximum paid-up share capital 
between 1.5 and 3 crores),17 then these firms and the Group 3 firms have essentially 
identical mean asset size. The robustness checks below use this overlap in size to 
                                                
16 Note that Figure 2 uses all observations for which data on total assets exists, not just the estimating sample for the 
regression analysis. 
17 In Figure 2 (and the analysis below), the cutoff for defining “larger” non-Clause 49 firms is formulated to include 
all firms that had a maximum value of paid-up share capital (at any point in the sample period) exceeding Rs. 1.5 
crores but below 3 crores, in order to define a set of firms that (like the Clause 49 or Group 3 categories) is fixed over 
time. Note, though, that there is relatively little change in paid-up share capital over time for a given firm. 
13
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construct more precise tests of the central hypothesis, focusing only on firms of similar 
size.  
Figure 3 shows the average value of Tobin’s q for Clause 49 firms and non-Clause 
49 firms for each year of the sample period. Prior to the introduction of Section 23E in 
2004, Clause 49 firms had somewhat lower q than did unaffected firms. Around the 
time of the introduction of stronger penalties, however, the Clause 49 firms experienced 
a substantial increase in q (relative to the control group of non-Clause 49 firms). While 
this increase appears to persist into the subsequent year (2005), it is not unreasonable to 
expect that the market may have adjusted somewhat slowly to the new regime, as new 
information appeared about the seriousness of the authorities. By 2006, the increase in q 
appears to level off. Thus, the general pattern in Figure 3 is broadly consistent with the 
paper’s hypothesis; however, the underlying growth in q for both groups of firms over 
this period highlights the need to control for other relevant factors and, in particular, for 
firm-specific time trends. 
Summary statistics for the basic estimating sample, which consists of 28,672 
observations at the firm-year level over the period 1998-2006 on 4335 firms, are reported 
in Table 1. Note that this represents only about half the observations in Prowess for 
financial statement data, because of the more limited availability of the share price data 
used to construct q. Also, missing values for many of the control variables reduce the 
sample size further in many of the regressions. Note also that the regressions (as 
described below) are implemented in first differences, leading to the loss of the first 
year’s observations even in the most basic specification. 
V.  EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
The central hypothesis of the paper concerns the interaction between corporate 
governance reforms and sanctions or enforcement provisions. As described above, 
different groups of firms became subject to the Clause 49 reforms over the period 2000-
14
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2002. By 2003, all firms that were affected by the 2000 Clause 49 reforms were expected 
to be in compliance with its provisions. However, there was no enforcement of these 
rules, except through the threat of delisting. The aim of the basic analysis is to test the 
impact of the stronger enforcement provisions that took effect in 2004 (involving severe 
financial penalties). These penalties applied to all Clause 49 firms (but not of course to 
firms that were not expected to comply with Clause 49). 
In testing the hypothesis that stronger enforcement of Clause 49 provisions led to 
an increase in firm value, the basic empirical specification is the following: 
qit = β(CL49i*S23Et) + Xitγ + μi + git + δt + νit                            (2) 
where qit is Tobin’s q (defined as in Eq. (1) above) for firm i in year t. CL49i is an 
indicator variable for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 by 2003. Note that, 
strictly speaking, the applicability of Clause 49 is a time-varying variable, with the rules 
applying to different firms at different times. However, all of this variation occurred 
before 2003, and so plays no role in this particular test (this additional variation is used 
in some supplementary analyses – see below). S23Et is an indicator for years following 
2003 (i.e. 2004-2006). The terms μi and δt are firm and year fixed effects, respectively, 
and νit is the error term. 
Xit is a vector of control variables. In the basic specification, it includes the 
following. Changes in firm size over time are controlled for using sales. Revenue from 
exports is often viewed as a particularly powerful sign of successful performance by 
Indian firms, so total exports are included as a further control. A number of variables 
are included to correct for potential mismeasurement of q.  Given the issue of whether 
the full book value of debt is captured by the “borrowings” variable in Prowess (see 
above), current liabilities are included as a control. Intangible assets may be poorly 
measured in the book value of assets (the denominator in Eq. (1)), so the two measures 
of research and development (R&D) expenditures provided in Prowess (R&D on the 
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capital account and R&D on the current account) are included, along with advertising 
expenses. Finally, to control for changes over time in the risk associated with a firm’s 
stock, a measure of stock price volatility is also included.18 A number of additional 
control variables are used in robustness checks, as described below. 
The basic approach used in Eq. (2) is a differences-in-differences approach, 
where the hypothesis is that β > 0, with Clause 49 firms constituting the “treatment” 
group and unaffected firms the “control” group. An important class of alternative 
explanations for any increase in firm value among Clause 49 firms is that, being larger 
and presumably more successful, these firms may have experienced more rapid growth 
in value for reasons unrelated to the reforms. Thus, it is vital to include (in addition to 
firm fixed effects and year effects) the firm-specific time trends git; here, gi represents the 
firm-specific growth rate in q for firm i.19 Hence, the estimated effect β represents the 
extent to which a Clause 49 firm’s value deviates from its underlying trend following 
the reforms, relative to the corresponding deviation for unaffected firms. 
The specification in Eq. (2) can be implemented using estimation in first 
differences (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 315-316). This involves estimating: 
Δqit = βΔ(CL49i*S23Et) + ΔXitγ + gi + ζt + ηit                   (3) 
where Δqit = qit - qi,t-1, and other changes are defined analogously; ζt is the year effect and 
ηit the error term in the first-differenced model (representing the changes in δt and νit , 
respectively). Note that the firm effect μi in Eq. (2) drops out of Eq. (3). However, the 
                                                
18 The volatility measure uses monthly data on firms’ stock prices. For firm i in year t, it represents the standard 
deviation of firm i’s monthly price across the months of year t; this is annualized, and scaled by firm i’s mean 
(annual) stock price in year t.  
19 The specification in Eq. (2) is sometimes described as a “random growth” or “random trend” model. It might be 
thought that in many contexts, q (being essentially a ratio of market to book valuation) would not exhibit a time 
trend, tending to converge towards one. However, in this dataset, there is a marked tendency for q to increase over 
time; for instance the mean (Winsorized) q in 1998 is about 0.7, while that in 2006 is about 1.2. 
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firm-specific trend gi can be estimated by including a firm effect in the estimation of Eq. 
(3). 
VI. RESULTS 
VI.1) Basic Results and Robustness Checks 
The results using the specification described above are reported in Table 2. In the 
first column, the specification is that in Eq. (3), excluding the firm-specific trend gi (and 
hence essentially equivalent to a model with firm and year effects). Using the full 
dataset of over 4000 firms over the period 1998-2006, there is a positive and statistically 
significant association between the Section 23E sanctions and firm value (this and all 
subsequent results use robust (White, 1980) standard errors that are clustered at the 
firm level).20 Adding firm-specific time trends (Column 2) does not substantively 
change this result. In Column 3, the basic set of controls is added. While this reduces the 
sample size considerably due to the unavailability of data on some of the controls,21 the 
basic result is strengthened: stronger enforcement appears to lead to a positive effect on 
the value of affected firms (relative to unaffected firms), and this effect is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of this effect is also substantial: the estimated 
coefficient of 0.09278 implies an increase in q of over 0.09, which is over 10% of the 
mean value of q (0.87) in the dataset.22 
 Moreover, the effect appears to be specifically related to the penalties and 
enforcement provisions of Section 23E, as opposed to the wider environment associated 
with Clause 49. Adding the time-varying variable Rit, which reflects the nominal 
applicability of Clause 49 provisions to firm i in year t, does not change the large and 
                                                
20 Clustering the standard errors also helps to address issues arising from serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan, 2004). 
21 For instance, the monthly stock price data used to compute the volatility measure is unavailable for 2006, so 
including this control eliminates that year from the estimating sample. 
22 The “average treatment effect on the treated” (ATT) is even larger, as the mean q for Clause 49 firms in 2003 is 0.79. 
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significant coefficient on the Section 23E variable. Furthermore, the coefficient on Rit is 
indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the nominal duty to comply with Clause 49 
(subject only to the threat of delisting) had little impact on firm value.23 This highlights 
the importance for corporate governance of the enforcement (rather than merely the 
enactment) of rules. 
This basic result is robust to a variety of checks. The set of firms in the basic 
sample includes government-owned firms (SOEs) and firms in which foreign 
corporations own controlling stakes (as the reforms in theory applied to them as well).24 
However, it might be the case that foreign-controlled firms follow home country 
governance rules, and so are unlikely to be affected by the reforms. SOEs may in 
practice be insulated from the reforms or from their enforcement,25 and in any event 
may not solely be motivated by profit maximization (Goswami, 2003). However, as 
shown in Column 1 of Table 3, the results are robust to omitting foreign-controlled and 
government-controlled firms from the sample.   
  Table 2 only includes a basic set of controls, but the basic results are robust to 
the addition of a variety of other controls, such as additional measures of accounting 
performance. For instance, adding profits before depreciation, interest and taxes 
(PBDIT; a standard measure of accounting performance used for instance by Bertrand et 
al. (2002)) or a measure of accounting returns (PBDIT divided by the book value of 
                                                
23 Note, however, that Clause 49 firms seem to have experienced an increase in value (relative to non-Clause 49 firms) 
in 1999, when the Birla report specified which categories of firms would be subject to Clause 49. While this effect is 
only of borderline statistical significance, it is broadly consistent with the findings of the event study of Black and 
Khanna (2007). It should also be noted that it is not surprising that Rit does not have an effect, given that the initial 
impact of Clause 49 designation is likely to have been capitalized in 1999. Thereafter, the difference between e.g. 
Group 1 and Group 2 firms (which amounts to only one year’s difference in the date by which the firm is expected to 
comply) is unlikely to be important. 
24 Foreign-controlled firms are identified as those reported as “Private (Foreign)” in the business group data, while 
government-owned firms are reported as either “Central Govt. - Commercial Enterprises”  or “State Govt. - 
Commercial Enterprises.”  
25 The recent enforcement proceedings in India suggest that SOEs will not be exempt from enforcement; see 
Rukhaiyar, note 20. 
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assets) does not affect the basic results. A concern with any regression modeling firm 
value is that q may be affected by forward-looking information about firms’ future 
prospects that is observable to investors but not to the researcher. These unobservable 
factors can be proxied by future sales growth (computed as the change in sales from 
year t to year (t + 1), divided by sales in year t). Adding this variable to the specification 
leads to highly consistent results.26 
It was noted earlier that Clause 49 applied to all newly-listed firms from the date 
of listing. However, these new firms cannot be identified with certainty in the Prowess 
data. In the basic analysis, all firms that enter the dataset after 1999 are classified as 
Clause 49 firms; however, this introduces the possibility of misclassification. Thus, 
Column 1 of Table 3 reports the results from a sample excluding these new firms. The 
estimated effect is almost identical to that in Table 2 (and in any event the number of 
firms involved is only 30, out of 2642 in the sample in Column 3 of Table 2). Moreover, 
the results are also robust to reclassifying these firms as part of the non-Clause 49 
group.  
VI.2) The Role of CalPERS 
The identification of the Section 23E treatment effect relies on there being no 
other confounding events that occurred in 2004. One potential violation of this 
assumption arises from the role of foreign institutional investors. In April, 2004, the 
California state employees’ pension fund (known as CalPERS) announced that India’s 
stock market met its criteria for undertaking investment.27 Reports suggest that 
CalPERS subsequently invested substantially in Indian firms. CalPERS is well-known 
(in the US setting) as an activist shareholder with a keen interest in corporate 
                                                
26 The results are also robust to using a variety of alternative formulations of the dependent variables, such as 
defining q to include current liabilities or deferred tax liabilities, Winsorizing q at 1% rather than 5%, and using the 
market-to-book ratio rather than q. 
27 See Omkar Goswami, “What CalPERS Should Mean to India Inc”, THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, April 27, 2004. 
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governance issues. Thus, it is possible that governance may have improved from 2004, 
not because of the interaction of Clause 49 and Section 23E, but rather because of 
activism (or the threat of activism) on the part of CalPERS and other foreign 
institutional investors. 
Data on the holdings of Indian firms by CalPERS is not available. However, 
Prowess reports the ownership structure of the firms in its dataset, including the 
percentage of a firm’s shares owned by foreign institutional investors. A “CalPERS 
effect” in 2004 could operate through an increase in the levels of foreign institutional 
ownership. Alternatively, CalPERS could have simply replaced other foreign investors, 
but may be a superior monitor of managerial performance. Both channels are captured 
by including the percentage of foreign institutional ownership, along with an 
interaction between the percentage of foreign institutional ownership and those years 
(2004-2006) in which CalPERS invested in the Indian stock market, in Column 3 of Table 
3. Clearly, the estimated effect of Section 23E remains highly significant (and is of even 
larger magnitude). Combined with the evidence (discussed later in the paper) that 
foreign institutional ownership did not increase significantly for Clause 49 firms in or 
after 2004, this suggests that the increase in the value of Clause 49 firms is attributable 
to the reforms, rather than to the entry of CalPERS or other foreign institutions into the 
Indian market. 
VI.3) Alternative Treatment and Control Groups 
The central challenge associated with inferring the causal impact of the reforms 
is of course the ability to identify a valid comparison group for those firms subject to the 
reforms. The control group of unaffected firms in the analysis so far includes all non-
Clause 49 firms. As shown in Figure 2, however, these firms are on average much 
smaller than the Clause 49 firms. For a variety of reasons, these smaller firms may not 
constitute good controls for the Clause 49 firms. One approach to addressing this 
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problem is to restrict attention to those non-Clause 49 firms that are relatively close to 
the cutoff for the applicability of Clause 49.  Column 1 of Table 4 reports the results 
using a sample that excludes all firms with a maximum value of paid-up share capital 
below Rs. 1.5 crores (roughly US$375,000). The basic result remains significant, and the 
coefficient is even larger than in the basic specification. 
As discussed above, there were three groups of firms subject to Clause 49: a 
small group of very large firms (with listing flag “A” on the BSE) that were expected to 
comply in 2001 (Group 1), a larger group of medium-sized firms that were expected to 
comply in 2002 (Group 2), and a large group of smaller firms that were expected to 
comply in 2003 (Group 3). Group 3 firms were defined as having a value of paid-up 
share capital exceeding Rs. 3 crores. As shown in Figure 2, Group 3 firms (while subject 
to Clause 49) are quite comparable in terms of asset size to those firms that were not 
subject to Clause 49, but which have a maximum value of paid-up share capital above 
Rs. 1.5 crores. Column 2 of Table 4 reports the results of a specification that excludes the 
Group 1 firms (i.e. 165 very large corporations). The comparison group remains the 
non-Clause 49 firms with a maximum value of paid-up share capital above Rs. 1.5 
crores. Again, the results are highly robust. Finally, Column 3 of Table 4 also excludes 
the medium-sized firms (Group 2). This reduces the sample by a further 1000 firms (in 
addition to the 165 Group 1 firms that are already excluded), and leaves a remaining 
group of Clause 49 firms (Group 3) that is highly comparable in terms of asset size to 
the control group. Even in this setting, the basic result is robust, and indeed the 
coefficient is larger in magnitude than in Table 2. 
Notwithstanding the robustness of the results in Table 4, there remains a 
potential concern about differences between Clause 49 and non-Clause 49 firms in terms 
of the criteria used in the law. Specifically, even among a set of firms with roughly 
similar asset sizes, does the fact that some of these firms have larger paid up share 
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capitalization confound the results? Recall that paid up share capitalization is 
essentially the product of the number of shares outstanding and the “face value” at 
which shares were originally issued. These were determined at the time of 
incorporation in the past or when the shares were originally issued (often decades 
before the sample period in this analysis). Thus, for this to confound the results, it 
would have to be the case that firms that had higher paid up share capitalization at the 
time of incorporation or when shares were issued would have therefore experienced an 
increase in q (unrelated to the Clause 49 reforms) in 2004, relative to firms that had 
lower original paid up share capitalization, but similar asset size as of 2004. Clearly, this 
seems highly unlikely, especially given the various controls for changes in firm 
characteristics in 2004 that are employed.28 
VI.4) A Regression Discontinuity Approach 
As described above, the difference-in-difference analysis shows a large and 
robust positive effect of the combination of Clause 49 and the strong penalties 
embodied in Section 23E on firm value. The sharp discontinuity created by the rules 
governing whether a firm is subject to Clause 49 enables the use of an alternative 
technique: a regression discontinuity approach. This focuses more specifically on the 
year in which the reform occurred and on the effect around the cutoffs for Clause 49. 
Thus, the regression discontinuity approach can address any remaining concerns about 
whether the effect primarily occurred in years after 2004, or whether it is driven by 
firms that are far from the cutoffs at which the reforms were applied. 
                                                
28 Moreover, it should be remembered that the analysis allows for firm-specific trends in q, and so even firms of very 
different sizes can serve as reasonable controls, as long as their trends in q are not affected by some other 
confounding factor that coincides with the reforms. 
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A basic regression discontinuity analysis would focus on the cross-section of firm 
values in 2004. A graphical illustration of this is shown in Figure 4.29 However, as we 
have longitudinal data, it is possible to construct a stricter test of the hypothesis by 
estimating a first-differenced regression discontinuity (FD-RD) model (e.g. Lemieux and 
Milligan, 2008). The advantage of the first-differenced specification is that it effectively 
controls for unobservables that may affect a firm’s average level of q. The specification 
is: 
Δqi,2004 = βCL49i + f(si,2004, wi) + ΔX i,2004γ + Indi + εi,2004                  (4) 
Here, Δqi,2004 = qi,2004 - qi,2003. CL49i is the indicator variable for Clause 49 firms defined 
above. In this context, it can be interpreted as the “treatment” associated with the 
introduction of Section 23E penalties for Clause 49 firms in 2004.  Thus, 
    CL49i = 1 if si,2004 ≥ 3 or wi ≥ 10           (5) 
and 0 otherwise; si,2004 is firm i’s paid-up share capitalization in 2004, and wi is the 
maximum observed value of firm i’s net worth in years up to and including 2004 (both 
measured in Rs. crores). Xi,2004 is a vector of controls, Indi is an indicator for firm i’s 
industry,30 and εi,2004 is the error term. 
 The central identifying assumption of the FD-RD approach is that f(si,2004, wi) is a 
smooth function of paid-up share capital and net worth. That is, f(si,2004, wi) controls for 
any continuous impact of si,2004 or wi on the change in a firm’s value in 2004, while β 
captures the discontinuous effect of the treatment (i.e. of becoming subject to Clause 49 
and Section 23E at the thresholds specified in Eq. (5)).31 In the reported results in Table 
                                                
29 Figure 4 shows q in 2004 for the set of firms with net worth in the 0-25 Rs. crores range that do not qualify for Clause 
49 on the paid-up share capital criterion (i.e. for which si,2004 < 3 in terms of Eq. (5) below). For these firms, net worth 
of 10 results in qualification for Clause 49; as expected, there is a substantial difference in q for firms above and below 
this threshold in Figure 4. 
30  Firms are classified into 181 industry groups, based on Prowess data on industries. 
31 There is some possibility of misclassification of newly listed firms, which may be subject to Clause 49 and Section 
23E even if they do not satisfy the share capital or net worth thresholds. However, the results in Table 5 are robust to 
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5,  f(si,2004, wi) is assumed to be linear in si,2004 and wi; however, the results are similar 
when using a flexible polynomial functional form for f(si,2004, wi).32 
 Table 5 reports the results of the FD-RD analysis. In Column 1, the estimated 
treatment effect (corresponding to β in Eq. (4)) is approximately 0.05, which is 
somewhat smaller but nonetheless comparable in magnitude to the difference-in-
difference estimate, and is statistically significant. This is especially notable because the 
FD-RD analysis only uses data from 2004; thus, it appears that the difference-in-
difference estimate is not driven by changes in q in subsequent years (which may 
potentially be unrelated to Section 23E). Moreover, this effect does not exist for other 
years – for “false experiments” in 2003 (Column 2) and 2005 (Column 3), the estimated β 
is statistically indistinguishable from zero, as would be expected if the 2004 effect is 
indeed caused by the enactment of Section 23E.33 
 The sample in Column 1 includes all firms, including very large and very small 
firms that are far from the Clause 49 thresholds. Thus, a possible concern is that the 
results are driven by these types of firms. In Column 4, Clause 49 firms in Group 1 (the 
very large firms with listing flag “A”) and non-Clause 49 firms with maximum paid-up 
share capital below 1.5 crores are omitted; the estimated effect, however, increases in 
both size and significance. In Column 5, Clause 49 firms in Group 2 are also omitted, 
leaving treatment and control groups that are highly comparable in terms of asset size 
(see Figure 2). Here, the effective sample size becomes quite small (while there are 670 
observations, the estimated effect is within-industry, and there are 129 industry groups 
                                                                                                                                                       
the omission of new firms. Also, adding a variable representing the first year in which a firm appears in the dataset 
(the proxy used to determine whether a firm is newly listed) to the arguments of f(.) leads to essentially identical 
results. 
32 The flexible polynomial form includes quadratic and cubic (as well as linear) functions of si,2004 and wi. 
33 The years 2003 and 2005 are of particular interest because the set of firms subject to Clause 49 was the same in those 
years as in 2004. For earlier years, estimated β’s are also generally insignificant using the appropriate classification of 
Clause 49 firms for each year. For 2006, some controls are missing, but using the available control variables leads to 
an insignificant β. 
24
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 84 [2008]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art84
 24
in Column 5). Nonetheless, the estimate is still large, and is of borderline statistical 
significance. 
VII.  INTERPRETATION AND EXTENSIONS  
 VII.1) Discussion 
The sequence of corporate governance reforms undertaken in India over the 
2000-2004 period, in particular the change in the sanctions regime in 2004, provides a 
highly unusual opportunity to identify the causal effect of corporate governance 
institutions on firm value. While the set of firms affected by the reforms was, on 
average, very different along dimensions such as size from the unaffected firms (as 
depicted in Figure 2), close examination of the rules for the application of the reforms 
enables the construction of treatment and control groups that appear to be quite 
comparable. The difference-in-difference estimate reported in Table 2 is highly robust to 
a variety of checks along these lines. In addition, an alternative approach – a regression 
discontinuity analysis – also leads to very similar conclusions. Overall, the results 
suggest that the stronger sanctions established in 2004 led to a significant increase in the 
value of affected firms relative to that of unaffected firms.   
 This conclusion raises an immediate question: if the reforms had the ability to 
raise firm value, why had firms not voluntarily adopted practices such as appointing 
outside directors and engaging in broader disclosure? Of course, controlling 
shareholders may not necessarily wish to maximize firm value, as they also care about 
private benefits of control. However, the debate in India prior to the reforms strongly 
suggests that firms were very interested in gaining access to capital from outside 
shareholders, especially foreign investors (Khanna, 2008). Even so, voluntary adoptions 
of stronger governance provisions at the firm level may not in themselves be 
sufficiently credible to investors, as the only sanctions on firms that renege are 
reputational. Rather, it appears that a mandatory set of governance rules, backed up by 
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strong enforcement provisions, was perceived to be necessary in order to realize the 
potential gains in firm value from better governance. In essence, Indian firms wished to 
tie their hands with respect to governance practices, and could only do so by becoming 
subject to a stronger enforcement regime.34  
 These results also point to a further question: if corporate governance reforms 
and enforcement increased firm value, what was the channel through which this effect 
operated? The rest of this section explores some of these possible additional 
consequences of the reforms, focusing on accounting performance, tunneling within 
business groups, and the impact on foreign institutional investment. It should be 
emphasized, however, that the post-reform sample period is short, and the increase in 
firm value does not necessarily imply that these types of changes would occur in the 
short run. Rather, it is possible that the increase in q reflected a capitalization of longer-
term improvements in the environment facing minority shareholders. 
VII.2) The Impact of the Reforms on Accounting Performance 
An obvious channel through which firm value may increase is through 
improvements in accounting performance. Table 6 reports the results of specifications 
that test the impact of the introduction of Section 23E on accounting profits (defined as 
“profits before depreciation, taxes and interest” or PBDIT) and on the return on assets 
(PBDIT scaled by total assets, denoted ROA). The specification used is essentially that of 
Eq. (3), with q replaced by the profit variables (the reported results also omit the control 
                                                
34 This interpretation may help account for one of the unusual features of the adoption of Clause 49, namely, that the 
reform process was initiated and supported by private industry rather than triggered by an Enron-like scandal. The 
CII drafted the first voluntary corporate governance code in India which formed the basis for the eventual Clause 49. 
Industry pushed for governance reform because access to capital was necessary to take advantage of the 
opportunities created by liberalization. The CII code in many respects was designed to attract foreign investors to 
Indian firms as many of its provisions are based on “best practices” at the international level. However, the voluntary 
code was not perceived to have generated a very high level of foreign investor interest and we see CII lobbying SEBI 
to enact governance reform (see Abhinaba Das, CII to Urge SEBI, BSE to make Corporate Governance Must for Listings, 
INDIAN EXPRESS, May 5, 1999). Enacting these reforms as law was apparently necessary to bolster the credibility of 
governance reform. 
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variables, but the conclusions are not substantively changed when they are included). If 
the firm-specific time trends are omitted (Column 1), then it appears that profits rose 
significantly in affected firms (relative to unaffected firms). However, this result does 
not survive the inclusion of firm-specific trends (Column 2). The effect on ROA is also 
positive, but not significant either with or without time trends. Thus, while the point 
estimates are positive, there is no robust evidence that accounting performance 
improved significantly for affected firms, relative to unaffected firms, over the sample 
period. 
VII.3) The Impact of the Reforms on Tunneling 
Many Indian firms belong to business groups. Consequently, a focus of the 
literature on Indian corporate governance has been the possibility of tunneling, a form 
of diversion that involves the controlling shareholders in a business group moving 
funds from group firms in which their ownership stakes (and hence their cash flow 
rights) are relatively low to group firms in which their ownership stakes are relatively 
high. Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002; hereafter BMM) develop a number of 
tests for identifying tunneling within business groups. The simplest of these is the 
following. Consider a given exogenous shock to the earnings of firms in a given 
industry. This shock should affect the reported earnings of a stand-alone (non-group) 
firm more than it does the reported earnings of a group firm. Suppose that the group 
firm is one in which the controlling shareholders have low cash flow rights; then, they 
will have an incentive to tunnel money out of the firm (through high-interest loans, the 
manipulation of transfer prices, or various other means). Similarly, if the group firm is 
one in which the controlling shareholders have high cash flow rights, it will also have 
reduced sensitivity to industry-level shocks, as money is tunneled into the firm 
regardless of its industry’s performance. 
BMM implement their test using the following specification: 
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yit = β0ŷit + β1(GRPi* ŷit) + Xitγ + μi + δt + νit                            (6) 
where yit is firm i’s income in year t; ŷit is a measure of the exogenous shock experienced 
by firm i in year t, calculated as the mean income for firms (other than i itself) in firm i’s 
industry in year t. GRPi is an indicator variable for firms that are reported by Prowess as 
belonging to a business group, Xit is a vector of controls,35 μi is a firm effect, δt is a year 
effect, and νit is the error term. Tunneling is inferred to exist under this approach if β1 < 
0. Column 1 of Table 7 reports the results from estimating Eq. (6) over the 1998-2006 
sample period. The negative estimate of β1 is consistent with tunneling, but (unlike in 
BMM’s 1989-1999 sample) it is not statistically significant. 
 The Clause 49 reforms and the stronger penalties enacted under Section 23E 
might be expected to have reduced the prevalence of tunneling. The following 
specification, based on Eq. (6), can be used to test this formally: 
yit = β0ŷit + β1(GRPi*ŷit) + β2(CL49i*S23Et) + β3Rit + β4((CL49i*S23Et)*(GRPi* ŷit)) + β4Rit 
 + β5Rit*(GRPi* ŷit)) + Xitγ + μi + δt + νit                                     (7) 
Here CL49i*S23Et is the interaction term that represents whether firm i in year t is 
subject to the Section 23E financial penalties for Clause 49 violations, while Rit is the 
(time-varying) variable that captures whether firm i was expected to comply with 
Clause 49 in year t (note that the effects on tunneling of sanctions and of legal rules are 
both of independent interest, and so are both included in this test). The essential 
question is whether the relative under-response of group firms to industry-level shocks 
is reduced by Section 23E sanctions (i.e. β4 > 0) and/or by the nominal application of 
Clause 49 (i.e. β5 > 0). Column 2 of Table 7 reports the results from estimating Eq. (7); 
both β3 and β5 have the expected sign (suggesting that both types of reforms reduced the 
prevalence of tunneling), but are only of borderline statistical significance. 
                                                
35 The controls in BMM are the natural log of total assets, an interaction between the log of assets and ŷit, and an 
interaction between the firm’s year of incorporation and ŷit. 
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 Another test for tunneling developed by BMM rests on the idea that, among 
group firms, those in which controllers or insiders have large ownership stakes will 
respond more positively to earnings shocks than will group firms in which controllers 
or insiders have lower ownership stakes. If the corporate governance reforms had the 
effect of reducing tunneling, then the extent to which firms in which insiders own large 
stakes would react more positively would have decreased after following the reforms. 
More formally, this test uses the following specification: 
yit = β0ŷit + β1InsOwnit + β2(CL49i*S23Et) + β3Rit + β4InsOwnit*ŷit  
+ β5(InsOwnit*ŷit)*(CL49i*S23Et) + β6(InsOwnit*ŷit)*Rit + Xitγ + μi + δt + νit      (8) 
Here, InsOwnit is the percentage of inside ownership in firm i in year t (based on the 
Prowess variable measuring total “promoter” ownership).36 The test examines whether 
β5 < 0 (i.e. whether Section 23E reduced tunneling) and/or β6 < 0 (i.e. whether the 
application of Clause 49 reduced tunneling). The results for Eq. (8) in Column 3 of Table 
7 show that this is the case only for β6; the estimated β5 is indistinguishable from zero. 
 BMM also propose that if tunneling occurs, then firms should respond to 
earnings shocks experienced by other firms within the same business group. If 
tunneling were affected by the reforms, then it would be expected that this tendency 
would be reduced as a result of Clause 49 and Section 23E. This can be tested using: 
yit = β0ŷit + β1ĝŷit + β2(CL49i*S23Et) + β3Rit + β4ĝŷit*ŷit + β5(ĝŷit*ŷit)*(CL49i*S23Et)  
+ β6(ĝŷit*ŷit)*Rit + Xitγ + μi + δt + νit                   (9) 
where ĝŷit is the mean income for firms (other than i itself) in firm i’s business group in 
year t. The hypotheses are that β5 < 0 (i.e. Section 23E reduced tunneling) and/or β6 < 0 
                                                
36 Note that the term “promoter” in the Indian context differs from standard US usage, and refers to firm insiders. In 
addition, data on ownership is available in Prowess on a consistent basis only from 2001, so this leads to a substantial 
reduction in the sample period and the sample size. 
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(i.e. the application of Clause 49 reduced tunneling). As shown in Column 4 of Table 7, 
however, the estimates of both β5 and β6 in Eq, (9) are indistinguishable from zero. 
 Overall, while there appears to be a relationship in some cases between the 
reforms and changes in the prevalence of tunneling, there is no robust evidence that 
either Clause 49 or Section 23E caused a reduction in tunneling within Indian business 
groups over the sample period. It should be remembered, however, that there is also no 
statistically significant evidence for tunneling (using the BMM tests) over the 1998-2006 
period, so it is not surprising that any changes to tunneling behavior that may have 
occurred are difficult to detect. 
VII.4) The Impact of the Reforms on Foreign Institutional Investment 
 As argued above, the reform process to India’s corporate governance 
environment was not externally imposed, but rather driven by the affected firms 
themselves. In seeking to tie their hands through governance reforms, firms appear to 
have been motivated by the desire to gain greater access to capital, and especially to 
foreign institutional investment (Khanna, 2008). Thus, a natural question to address is 
whether the reforms had the desired impact – i.e. whether foreign institutional 
investment (FII) rose in those firms affected by Section 23E (relative to unaffected 
firms).  
As Prowess reports the ownership structure of many of the firms in its dataset, 
including the fraction of the firm owned by foreign institutional investors, this 
hypothesis can be tested using a specification analogous to Eq. (3). In Columns 1 and 2 
of Table 8, FII is measured as a fraction of the total ownership by non-insiders; in 
Columns 3 and 4, FII is measured as a fraction of the total ownership by non-insider 
(foreign and Indian) institutional investors. Using the former definition, there appears 
to be an increase in FII for affected firms when firm-specific time trends are omitted 
(Column 1); however, this is not robust to the inclusion of firm-specific trends (Column 
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2). For the second measure, the effect is indistinguishable from zero both with and 
without trends. Thus, there is no robust evidence to suggest that the corporate 
governance reforms caused an increase in FII over the sample period. 
VIII. CONCLUSION  
While there has been extensive discussion across the fields of economics, law and 
finance of the effects of corporate governance, the central challenge has been to find 
credible evidence of a causal impact of governance practices on firm value, financial 
development, and the wider process of economic development. This paper uses a 
sequence of corporate governance reforms in India as a source of exogenous variation.  
These reforms had several unusual features that facilitate identification of this causal 
effect. In particular, a large group of firms was exempted from the reforms, and the 
complex rules for the application of the reforms created considerable overlap in the 
characteristics of affected and unaffected firms. Moreover, the introduction of severe 
financial penalties for the violation of the new corporate governance rules took place 
after the rules were already in force, thus decoupling the effects of substantive legal 
rules and of enforcement. 
Using this set of reforms, this paper finds a large and statistically significant 
positive effect (amounting to over 10% of firm value) of the governance reforms in 
combination with the sanctions. The primary contribution of the paper is thus to add to 
the very limited body of causal evidence for the proposition that corporate governance 
affects firm value. Moreover, the paper also highlights the role of enforcement – the 
substantive legal rules are shown to have no discernible effect until the stronger 
sanctions were introduced. The paper also explores the impact of the reforms on 
various other outcomes, though the short post-reform sample period makes it difficult 
to detect any changes in accounting performance, tunneling behavior, or foreign 
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investment. Rather, it appears that the increase in firm value capitalized expectations of 
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Clause 49 Firms Non-Clause 49 Firms
All Small All Large
 
Note: This graph represents the mean book value of assets for four subgroups of firms, using the data on 
“total assets” in Prowess. Clause 49 firms are defined as all those that became subject to Clause 49 at some 
point over the sample period (including newly listed firms from 2000 subsequent years). All other firms 
are classified as “Non-Clause 49” firms. “Small” Clause 49 firms are defined as Group 3 firms (those with 
net worth < 25 crores and paid-up share capital < 10 crores, but with paid-up share capital ≥ 3 crores; these 
became subject to Clause 49 in 2003). “Large” non-Clause 49 firms are those with maximum paid-up 
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Year
q (Clause 49 firms) q (non-Clause 49 firms)
 
Note: This graph depicts annual mean Tobin’s q (Winsorized at 5% from above) for Clause 49 and non-
Clause 49 firms for each year of the sample period (1998-2006). Clause 49 firms are defined as all those 
that became subject to Clause 49 at some point over the sample period (including newly listed firms from 
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Note: This graph illustrates Tobin’s q in 2004 for firms that are close to the net worth threshold for the 
application of Clause 49 (i.e. wi = 10 in Eq. (5)). Tobin’s q is defined as in Eq. (1), and Winsorized at the 5% 
level from above. “Maximum Net Worth” is the maximum value of net worth observed for a given firm 
in the period up to (and including) 2004. The sample of firms is restricted to those firms with maximum 
net worth in the range 0-25 Rs. crores, and with paid up share capital below 3 Rs. crores (i.e. si < 3 in Eq. 
(5)). Note that, for these firms, the wi ≥ 10 threshold is binding, in the sense that (because they do not meet 













Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008
 37










Tobin’s q (Winsorized at 
5% from above) 
0.87 0.67 28672 
(Clause 49)*(Section23E) 
 
0.30 0.46 28672 
Sales (Rs. crores) 
 
356.56  3261.19 25415 
Exports (Rs. crores) 
 
36.26     352.77 25415 
Current Liabilities     
(Rs. crores) 
92.61     943.50 28672 
R & D, capital account 
(Rs. crores) 
0.32     5.18 28672 
R & D, current account 
(Rs. crores) 
18.80     506.44     28512 
Advertising Expense 
(Rs. crores)  
1.82 15.66 28672 
Volatility 
 
1.08 1.10 18550 
Note: These descriptive statistics refer to the set of observations at the firm-year level for which the 
market price data required to compute Tobin’s q exists (and which is used as the basic estimating sample 
in the regression analysis). Tobin’s q is defined as in Eq. (1), and is Winsorized at the 5% level from above. 
“(Clause 49)*(Section23E)” is an interaction term between an indicator for those firms that were subject to 
Clause 49 at any stage (including newly listed firms from 2000 onwards) and an indicator for the years in 
which Section 23E applied (2004-2006). The volatility measure uses monthly data on firms’ stock prices. 
For firm i in year t, it represents the standard deviation of firm i’s monthly price across the months of year 
t; this is annualized, and scaled by firm i’s mean (annual) stock price in year t.  All other variables are as 
described in the text. 
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Table 2: Corporate Governance Reforms, Enforcement, and Firm Value – Basic Results 








 Dependent variable: Change in Tobin’s q 
Changes in:     
(Clause49-firm) 0.07174 0.06339 0.09278 0.09304 
  *(Section23E) (0.02141)*** (0.02401)*** (0.03461)*** (0.03479)*** 
Clause 49     -0.01360 
Applicability (= 1)    (0.00936) 
Sales   -0.00001 -0.00001 
   (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Exports   -0.00002 -0.00002 
   (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Current    -0.00004 -0.00004 
  Liabilities   (0.00002)* (0.00002)* 
R & D (capital    -0.00105 -0.00104 
  account)   (0.00067) (0.00067) 
R & D (current    -0.00001 -0.00001 
  account)   (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Advertising    -0.00036 -0.00036 
  Expense   (0.00028) (0.00028) 
Volatility   -0.00226 -0.00227 
   (0.00440) (0.00440) 
     
Year Effects? Y Y Y Y 
     
Firm-Specific  N Y Y Y 
Time Trends?     
No. of Obs. 22964 22964 12869 12869 
No. of Firms 4087 4087 2642 2642 
R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.19 0.19 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in Tobin’s q; q is defined as in Eq. (1), and Winsorized at the 
5% level from above. The independent variable of interest is an interaction term between an indicator 
for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 at any stage (including newly listed firms from 2000 
onwards) and an indicator for the years in which Section 23E applied (2004-2006). “Clause 49 
Applicability” is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 for firm-years in which firms were 
supposed to be complying with Clause 49; unlike the “Clause 49 firm” variable, it is time-varying for a 
given firm, based on the gradual implementation schedule illustrated in Figure 1. Robust standard 
errors (clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
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Table 3: Corporate Governance Reforms, Enforcement, and Firm Value – Robustness Checks 
for Influential Subsets of Firms and the Impact of CalPERS 












 Dependent variable: Change in Tobin’s q 
     
Changes in:     
(Clause49-firm)*(Section23E)  0.08596 0.09341 0.11451 
    (0.03557)** (0.03458)*** (0.03898)*** 
Foreign Institutional Ownership (%)   0.00710 
      (0.00285)** 
(Foreign Institutional Ownership)   -0.00083 
  *(Post2003)    (0.00176) 
       
Basic Controls, Year Effects, and Firm-
Specific Time Trends? 
 Y Y Y 
No. of Obs.  11818 12805 8180 
No. of Firms  2471 2612 2195 
R-squared  0.19 0.19 0.27 
     
Note: The dependent variable is the change in Tobin’s q; q is defined as in Eq. (1), and Winsorized at the 
5% level from above. The independent variable of interest is an interaction term between an indicator 
for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 at any stage (including newly listed firms from 2000 
onwards) and an indicator for the years in which Section 23E applied (2004-2006). Foreign institutional 
ownership is the percentage of the firm’s shares owned by foreign institutions; this is also interacted 
with an indicator for the years in which CalPERS invested in the Indian stock market (2004-2006). 
“Basic” controls are changes in sales, exports, current liabilities, R & D, advertising, and volatility (as in 
Table 2). Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
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Table 4: Corporate Governance Reforms, Enforcement, and Firm Value – Robustness Checks 
Using Alternative Groups of Firms 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
  
 Dependent variable: Changes in Tobin’s q  
  
Treatment Group: All Clause 49 
Firms 
 Medium-Sized 
and Small Clause 
49 Firms 
Small Clause 49 
Firms 
Control Group: Non-Clause 49 
Firms with Max 
Share Cap > 1.5 
crores 
Non-Clause 49 
Firms with Max 
Share Cap > 1.5 
crores 
Non-Clause 49 
Firms with Max 
Share Cap > 1.5 
crores 
    
Changes in:    
(Clause49-firm) 0.15299 0.13575 0.12367 
  *(Section23E) (0.04805)*** (0.04788)*** (0.05348)** 
    
Basic Controls, Year 
Effects, and Firm-







No. of Obs. 12553 11461 4889 
No. of Firms 2565 2400 1316 
R-squared 0.19 0.21 0.21 
    
Note: The dependent variable is the change in Tobin’s q; q is defined as in Eq. (1), and 
Winsorized at the 5% level from above. The independent variable of interest is an interaction 
term between an indicator for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 at any stage (including 
newly listed firms from 2000 onwards) and an indicator for the years in which Section 23E 
applied (2004-2006). “Basic” controls are changes in sales, exports, current liabilities, R & D, 
advertising, and volatility (as in Table 2). The control group of firms consists of those firms that 
were never subject to Clause 49, but for which the maximum observed value (over the sample 
period) of paid-in share capital exceeded 1.5 crores. In Column 1, the treatment group consists of 
all firms that were subject to Clause 49 at any stage (as in Table 2). In Column 2, the treatment 
group consists of these Clause 49 firms, excluding those (generally very large firms) with 
Bombay (Mumbai) stock exchange listing flag “A”. In Column 3, the treatment group consists of 
Clause 49 firms, excluding those with listing flag “A” and those in Group 2 (i.e. with net worth ≥ 
25 crores or paid-in share capital ≥ 10 crores). That is, the Column 3 treatment group consists only 
of Group 3 firms (as defined in the text), along with a small number of newly-listed firms. 
Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
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Table 5: Corporate Governance Reforms, Enforcement, and Firm Value – Regression 
Discontinuity Analysis 














































      
Clause 49 Firm 0.04939 -0.01481 -0.00242 0.07594 0.07412 
  (= 1) (0.02445)** (0.03415) (0.04996) (0.02887)*** (0.04197)* 
Paid-up Share 0.00007 0.00005 -0.00001 -0.00020 -0.00961 
  Capital (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00022) (0.00785) 
Net Worth 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00017 0.00111 
   (0.000004) (0.000005)* (0.000005)*** (0.00008)** (0.00248) 
Constant 0.07756 0.06212 0.34727 0.03321 0.04526 
 (0.02342)*** (0.03321)* (0.04886)*** (0.02821) (0.04496) 















No. of Obs. 1835 1754 1863 1626 670 
No. of 
Industries 
175 175 174 170 129 
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.10 
      
Note: The dependent variable is the change in Tobin’s q for the specified years; q is defined as in Eq. (1), 
and Winsorized at the 5% level from above. The independent variable of interest is an indicator for those 
firms that were subject to Clause 49 as of 2003 (including newly listed firms from 2000 onwards). “Basic” 
controls are changes in sales, exports, current liabilities, R & D, advertising, and volatility (as in Table 2). 
Industry effects are defined for groups of 181 different industries. Robust standard errors (clustered at the 
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Table 6: Corporate Governance Reforms, Enforcement, and Accounting Performance 






















     
Changes in:     
(Clause49-firm) 8.13592 2.26844 0.02198 0.01763 
  *(Section23E) (1.69381)*** (1.98376) (0.02054) (0.02462) 
     
Year Effects? Y Y Y Y 
Firm-Specific Time 
Trends? 
N Y N Y 
     
No. of Obs. 45180 45180 44949 44949 
No. of Firms 8956 8956 8945 8945 
R-squared 0.0012 0.0014 0.0018 0.0020 
     
Note: The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is profits before depreciation, interest and taxes 
(PBDIT). The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is the return on assets, computed as PBDIT 
divided by total assets. The independent variable of interest is an interaction term between an indicator 
for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 at any stage (including newly listed firms from 2000 
onwards) and an indicator for the years in which Section 23E applied (2004-2006). Robust standard 
errors (clustered at the firm level) are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
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Table 7: Corporate Governance Reforms, Enforcement, and Tunneling 
















 Dependent variable: Profits 
Industry Shock 14.8337 14.3523 54.3096 22.7635 
 (13.2551) (12.9163) (22.4159)** (16.9722) 
(Group Firm)*(Industry Shock) -0.1428 -0.7141   
   (0.2589) (0.4299)*   
(Clause49 Firm)*(Section23E)  6.0687 48.0008 23.7720 
  (3.9873) (15.1709)*** (7.3288)*** 
Clause49 Applicability  -5.6041 -69.0701 -2.5093 
  (2.5104)** (21.0732)*** (5.6547) 
(Group Firm)*(Industry Shock)  0.1746   
  *(Clause49 Firm)*(Section23E)  (0.1031)*   
(Group Firm)*(Industry Shock)  0.2865   
  *(Clause49 Applicability)  (0.1476)*   
Inside Ownership   -0.0876  
     (0.5948)  
(Inside Ownership)*(Industry Shock)  0.0070  
   (0.0060)  
(Inside Ownership)*(Industry Shock)  0.0016  
  *(Clause49 Firm)*(Section23E)  (0.0039)  
(Inside Ownership)*(Industry Shock)  -0.0055  
  *(Clause49 Applicability)   (0.0024)**  
Group Shock    -0.1410 
    (0.1764) 
(Group Shock)*(Industry Shock)   0.0137 
  *(Clause49 Firm)*(Section23E)    (0.0369) 
(Group Shock)*(Industry Shock)   0.0181 
  *(Clause49 Applicability)    (0.0598) 
Log of Assets, Interaction Terms, 
Year Effects, and Firm Effects? 
Y Y Y Y 
No. of Obs. 47795 47795 6285 17410 
No. of Firms 7700 7700 1315 2720 
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.25 
Note: The dependent variable is profits before depreciation, interest and taxes (PBDIT). The independent variable 
of interest is an interaction term between an indicator for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 at any stage 
(including newly listed firms from 2000 onwards) and an indicator for the years in which Section 23E applied 
(2004-2006). The industry shock is the mean PBDIT in that year for the firm’s industry (excluding the firm’s own 
PBDIT from the calculation). “Group Firm” is an indicator variable = 1 for firms that belong to business groups.  
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“(Clause 49)*(Section23E)” is an interaction term between an indicator for those firms that were subject to Clause 49 
at any stage (including newly listed firms from 2000 onwards) and an indicator for the years in which Section 23E 
applied (2004-2006). “Clause 49 Applicability” is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 for firm-years in 
which firms were supposed to be complying with Clause 49. The group shock is the mean PBDIT in that year for 
the firm’s industry (excluding the firm’s own PBDIT from the calculation). All other variables are as defined in the 
text. The sample excludes foreign-controlled and government-controlled firms. Robust standard errors (clustered at 
the firm level) are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 8: Corporate Governance Reforms, Enforcement, and Foreign Institutional Investment 

































a Fraction of 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Changes in:     
(Clause49-firm) 0.00442 -0.00277 0.01578 -0.00159 
  *(Section23E) (0.00141)*** (0.00176) (0.00998) (0.01303) 
     
Year Effects? Y Y Y Y 
Firm-Specific Time 
Trends? 
N Y N Y 
     
No. of Obs. 13205 13205 9308 9308 
No. of Firms 3585 3585 2526 2526 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Note: The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is foreign institutional ownership as a fraction of all 
outside (“nonpromoter”) ownership. The dependent variable in Columns 3 and 4 is foreign institutional 
ownership as a fraction of all institutional outside (“nonpromoter”) ownership. The independent 
variable of interest is an interaction term between an indicator for those firms that were subject to 
Clause 49 at any stage (including newly listed firms from 2000 onwards) and an indicator for the years 
in which Section 23E applied (2004-2006). Robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) in 
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Appendix 1:  Summary of Clause 49 
Characteristic Clause 49 
Director 
Independence 
• Requirement – 50% independent directors if Chairman is executive director 
or 33% if Chairman is a nonexecutive. 
• Definition – no material pecuniary relationship with company, not related to 
Board or one level below Board and no prior relationship with the Company 
for the last 3 years.   




• Meet 4 times a year (maximum 3 months between meetings)  
• Limits on number of committees a director can be on (10), but only 5 for 
which director can be Chair of committee. 
• Code of Conduct (Ethics) required. 
Audit Committee 
Composition 
• At least 3 directors (two-thirds must be independent).  
• All financially literate.  
• At least one having accounting or financial management experience. 
Audit Committee 
Role & Powers 
• minimum 4 meetings/year (gap between meetings not exceed 4 months). 
• broad role – review statutory and internal auditors as well as internal audit 
function, obtain outside legal or other professional advise, and review 
whistleblower program if one exists amongst other things. 
Disclosures 
• Related party transactions,  
• Accounting treatments and departures,  
• Risk management,  
• Annual report include discussion of internal controls adequacy, significant 
trends, risks, and opportunities, 
• Proceeds from offerings,  
• Compensation for directors  (including nonexecutives and obtain 
shareholders’ approval),  
• Details of compliance history for last 3 years. 
• Corporate governance reports (and disclose adoption, if any, of mandatory 
and non-mandatory requirements). 
Certifications 
• CEO & CFO:  
 financial statements 
 effectiveness of internal controls 
 inform audit committee of any significant changes in the above. 
• Auditor or Company Secretary: 
 Compliance with corporate governance 
Subsidiary 
Companies 
• At least one Independent director of Holding Company should sit as a 
director on Board of material non-listed Indian subsidiary. 
• Significant transactions report to Holding Company Board (along with 
subsidiary board’s minutes). 
Other  
Recommendations: 
• Whistleblower policy is optional 
• Independent directors loses status as “independent” if served 9 years at 
company 
• Training board members 
• Evaluate nonexecutive board performance. 
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